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FEDERAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION-INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION-RE-
VIEW OF ExTRADITION PRoCEEDINGs-The Consul General of Venezuela filed 
a complaint in a federal district court, pursuant to treaty1 and statute,2 
seeking the extradition of former President Perez Jimenez for the crimes 
of murder and embezzlement. While the required extradition hearings 
were pending, Venezuela sought to use the civil deposition and subpoena 
procedure8 to compel several New York banks to produce records of 
deposits and to give depositions concerning the accounts of Jimenez and 
his alleged confederates. Jimenez moved for a protective order' to pre-
vent Venezuela from obtaining and using these records as evidence against 
him in the extradition hearings. On appeal from the denial of this motion, 
held, appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The courts of appeals have 
no jurisdiction of appeals from the decisions of a district judge sitting in 
an extradition proceeding under authority of a statute conferring this 
power upon "any justice or judge of the United States,"5 since the dis-
trict judge is not then acting in his capacity as a "district court of the 
United States."8 Jimenez v. A-risteguieta, 290 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1961). 
An extradition hearing is a civil proceeding in the nature of a pre-
liminary criminal hearing. In such a proceeding the presiding magistrate 
must decide whether the evidence for the demanding government makes 
a prima fade case warranting the magistrate's commitment of the accused 
l Treaty of Extradition With Venezuela, Jan. 21, 1922, 43 Stat. 1698, T.S. No. 675. 
2 "Whenever there is a treaty or convention for extradition between the United States 
and any foreign government, any justice or judge of the United States, or any commis• 
sioner authorized to do so by a court of the United States, or any judge of a court of 
record of general jurisdiction of any State, may, upon complaint made under oath, 
charging any person found within his jurisdiction, with having committed within the 
jurisdiction of any such foreign government any of the crimes provided for by such 
treaty or convention, issue his warrant for the apprehension of the person so charged, 
that he may be brought before such justice, judge, or commissioner, to the end that 
the evidence of criminality may be heard and considered. If, on such hearing, he deems 
the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge under the provisions of the proper treaty 
or convention, he shall certify the same, together with a copy of all the testimony taken 
before him, to the Secretary of State, that a warrant may issue upon the requisition of 
the proper authorities of such foreign government, for the surrender of such person, 
according to the stipulations of the treaty or convention; and he shall issue his warrant 
for the commitment of the person so charged to the proper jail, there to so remain until 
such surrender shall be made." 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1958). 
3 Fm. R. Civ. P. 26, 45. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are specifically 
inapplicable to extradition proceedings. FED. R. CRIM. P. 54(b)(5). 
4 FED. R. CIV. P. 80(b). 
5 18 u.s.c. § 8184 (1958). 
6 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1958). One judge concurred specially, and only upon grounds that 
the order was not final, and hence not appealable. 
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to the Secretary of State for extradition.7 Whether there can be any direct 
appeal from the final decisions of a district judge sitting in extradition 
proceedings seems presently unsettled, although there is substantial dicta 
that such decisions are not appealable.8 In the only two previously re-
ported decisions on this issue-both also in proceedings ancillary to the 
attempted extradition of Jimenez-federal appellate courts have assumed 
jurisdiction, thus tacitly upholding a right of appeal.9 In the principal 
case the Fifth Circuit has apparently overruled its prior decision without 
discussion or mention. The many cases which deny, by implication or dicta, 
the existence of a right of appeal should not be considered binding in 
presently deciding this issue. All involved habeas corpus proceedings, 
wherein the limited scope of review is well recognized.1° Close examina-
tion of many of these decisions suggests a judicial attitude that some form 
of direct review of issues not reviewable in habeas corpus proceedings 
would be possible in other situations.11 Also, all these cases were decided 
prior to, or based upon cases decided prior to, the establishment of circuit 
courts of appeals and the modern federal appellate structure.12 
Since Congress admittedly has the power to provide for appeal in 
extradition cases,13 the critical question raised in the extradition context 
is whether the statutory language "appeals from all final decisions of the 
district courts of the United States"14 is broad enough to encompass such 
appeals from a district judge's decisions. No legislation specifically prohib-
its such an appeal, nor does any legislative history suggest such an exclu-
sionary congressional intent. The creation by the Fifth Circuit of an im-
1 Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913); Bryant v. United States, 167 U.S. 104 (1897); 
Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502 (1896); Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457 (1888); Ex parte 
Davis, 54 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1931); Sternaman v. Peck, 80 Fed. 883 (2d Cir. 1897). 
s See, e.g., Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 369 (1920), and cases cited therein; Ornelas 
v. Ruiz, supra note 7, at 508; Sternaman v. Peck, supra note 7; In re Keene's Extradition, 
6 F. Supp. 308 (S.D. Tex. 1934). 
9 Aristeguieta v. Jimenez, 274 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. granted sub nom. Aristc• 
guieta v. First Nat'l City Bank, 365 U.S. 840 (1961); First Nat'l City Bank v. Aristeguieta, 
287 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. granted, 365 U.S. 840 (1961). Cf. Merino v. Hocke, 289 
F.2d 636 (9th Cir. 1961). 
10 Sessions v. Manning, 227 F.2d 324 (4th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1008 (1956); 
United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 192 F.2d 540 (3d Cir. 1951), affd, 344 U.S. 561 (195!!); 
Pelley v. Botkin, 152 F.2d 12 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Sanders v. Sanford, 138 F.2d 415 (5th 
Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 744 (1944), and see text infra, at note 36. 
11 In re Oteiza y Lortes, 136 U.S. 330 (1890); Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457 (1888); 
Sternaman v. Peck, 80 Fed. 883 (2d Cir. 1897); Ex parte Van Aernam, 28 Fed. Cas. 931 
(No. 16824) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1854). See also Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311 (1925); 
Bingham v. Bradley, 241 U.S. 511 (1916); Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913); In re 
Extradition of D'Amico, 177 F.Supp. 648 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); In re Vandenrelpen, 28 Fed. 
Cas. 974 (No. 16844) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1877). 
12 The original circuit courts of appeals were established by Act of March 3, 1891, 
ch. 517, § 2, 26 Stat. 826. 
1s U.S. CoNsr. art. m, §§ 1, 2. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 
(1893) (dictum) • 
. 14 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1958). (Emphasis added.) 
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plied exception to the appeals statute thus appears somewhat questionable.15 
The majority opinion in the principal case cited two habeas corpus cases,16 
and two irrelevant decisions17 in stating that the term "judge of the United 
States,"18 as used in the extradition statute is not synonymous with a "dis-
trict court"11l as used in the relevant appellate review statute.20 But, as 
pointed out by the concurring judge,21 it is difficult to perceive how a 
United States district judge, while performing judicial functions,22 is in any 
way distinguishable from the district court.23 Seemingly it is unreasonable 
that the instant decision should be based upon the linguistic differences in 
the applicable statutes. 
15 It should be noted, however, that one court has dismissed such an appeal for lack 
of finality. Merino v. Hocke, 289 F.2d 636 (9th Cir. 1961). 
18 In re Oteiza y Lortes, 136 U.S. 330 (1890); and Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457 
(1888). 
lT Todd v. United States, 158 U.S. 278 (1895), which merely refused to extend the 
scope of a criminal statute beyond its clear language in such a way as to prejudice the 
defendant; Textile Mills Security Corp. v. Commissioners, 314 U.S. 326 (1941), decided 
only that the court of appeals may sit en bane and still be a court of appeals under the 
judicial code which said that a court of appeals shall consist of three judges. For cases 
which have held, in various situations, that "court" and "judge" are synonymous, see 
infra note 23. 
18 18 u.s.c. § 3184 (1958). 
111 28 u.s.c. § 1291 (1958). 
20 By the court's own unfortunate reasoning, however, it would seem that the action 
of the judge might be reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237 
(1946), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (1958). Section I defines an "agency" as "each 
authority ••• of the Government of the United States other than Congress, the courts, 
or the governments of the possessions [etc.] •••• " Should the court of appeals in the 
principal case be consistent in holding the "judge" not a "court," the actions of the 
extradition magistrate would be within the purview of the APA. Section IO(c) of the 
APA makes reviewable "every final agency action for which there is no other adequate 
remedy in any court." This approach raises the following questions: (I) whether 
the judge who is performing judicial functions was intended, with reference to the AP A, 
to be covered by "courts," and is thus exempted [Cf. Newman, What Agencies Are 
Exempt From the APA, 36 NoTRE DAME LAw. 320, 323 (1961)]; (2) whether this function 
of the judge is a discretionary one whose re,iewability is negatived by § IO(a) of the 
APA; (3) whether the statute regarding extradition proceedings and that regarding 
appeals may together be so read as to deem the appeal precluded, rather than merely 
ignored, by statute, to make applicable the other exception in § lO(a). The requirement 
in IO(c) that the action taken by the agency be "final" would seem to be no barrier, 
since the reasoning in the principal case rested on the unreviewability of any action of 
the extradition judge. 
21 Principal case at 108. 
22 Nor can it be maintained that an extradition hearing is not a judicial proceeding, 
and Congress could not have imposed the duty of conducting such a hearing upon a 
district judge unless it were, they being limited to the exercise of the "judicial power 
of the United States." U.S. CoNsr. art. III, § I. See United Steelworkers v. United States, 
361 U.S. 39 (1959); Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923); ICC v. Brimson, 
154 U.S. 447, 485 (1894). Cf. Federal Radio Comm'n v. General Elec. Co., 281 U.S. 464 
(1930). 
23 See United States, Petitioner, 194 U.S. 194 (1904); United States v. McCabe, 
129 Fed. 708 (1st Cir. 1904); Tsoi Yii v. United States, 129 Fed. 585 (9th Cir. 1904); 
United States v. Gee Lee, 50 Fed. 271 (9th Cir. 1892). Cf. In re Jackson, 55 Nev. 174, 28 
P.2d 125 (1934); Guild v. Meyer, 59 N.J. Eq. 390, 46 Atl. 202 (1900); Commonwealth v. 
ShawelJ, 325 Pa. 497, 191 Atl. 17 (1937). 
386 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
Although most extradition hearings are initiated before a federal dis-
trict judge,24 a further problem is presented because the statute also au-
thorizes the hearings to be commenced before a United States Commis-
sioner or any state judge of a court of record and general jurisdiction.25 
This raises the possibility that the appealability of extradition hearings 
might be dependent upon the forum chosen by the demanding govern-
ment in originating the proceedings. However, such an unfortunate dis-
parity of result could be avoided, at least in the case of proceedings be-
fore a commissioner. The district court which appoints the commissioner, 
having supervisory control over him as an officer of the court, may assume 
control of the proceedings whenever justice demands,28 or control the 
commissioner's actions and judgments by authority of the so-called "all 
writs" statute.27 If the district court reviews or refuses to review the ac-
tions of the commissioner, then these district court decisions should be 
appealable to the court of appeals to the same extent as if the district 
court were itself sitting as the examining magistrate.28 On the other hand, 
the possibility of appellate review if the proceedings were originated be-
fore a state judge is entirely speculative, since there are no reported deci-
sions or even dicta on this question. Perhaps there could be appellate jur-
isdiction within the state court system, with ultimate certiorari to the 
Supreme Court from the highest court of the state in which a decision 
could be had,29 or possibly the proceedings might be removable by the 
defendant to a federal district court,30 although one lower court has de-
nied this.31 For removal, the defendant would have to show that the pro-
ceedings were a "civil action,"32 but if removable, appellate jurisdiction 
24 Fink 8: Schwarz, International Extradition: The Holohan Murder Case, 39 A.B.A.J. 
297, 299 (1953). 
25 18 u.s.c. § 3184 (1958). 
26 United States v. :Berry, 4 Fed. 779 (D.C. Colo. 1880). See United States v. Allred, 
155 U.S. 591, 595 (1895); United States ex rel. D'Amico v. :Bishopp, 286 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 
1961); In re Grin, 112 Fed. 790 (N.D. Cal. 1901), afj'd, 187 U.S. 181 (1902). 
27 The courts "may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective 
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." 28 U.S.C. § 165l(a) 
(1958). 
28 See Merino v. Hocke, 289 F.2d 636 (9th Cir. 1961). Cf. Application of D'Amico, 
185 F. Supp. 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), appeal dismissed, 286 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1961). It is 
also significant to note that it has been held that a district court can review the actions 
of a commissioner in finding, in a preliminary criminal hearing, that there was probable 
cause to hold defendant for a grand jury. United States v. Florida, 165 F. Supp. 328 
(E.D. Ark. 1958); United States v. Zerbst, 111 F. Supp. 807 (E.D.S.C. 1953). 
29 28 u.s.c. § 1257 (1958). 
30 "Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought 
in a State Court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdic-
tion, may be removed by the defendant or defendants, to the district court of the United 
States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending." 
28 U.S.C. § 144l(a) (1958). 
31 In re Keene's Extradition, 6 F. Supp. 308 (S.D. Tex. 1934). 
32 As to the nature of the proceedings, examined in other contexts, compare United 
States ex rel. Oppenheim v. Hecht, 16 F.2d 955 (2d Cir.) (civil), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 769 
(1927), and United States ex rel. Klein v. Mulligan, 1 F. Supp. 635 (S.D.N.Y.) (civil), afj'd, 
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would thereafter be the same as if the proceedings were originated in the 
federal district court. Thus, regardless of where the extradition proceeding 
is begun, the dangers of totally disparate results in appealability may be 
circumvented. 
In examining the instant decision, the most logical theory upon which 
it could be rested is that the unusual nature of extradition proceedings 
makes them inherently unappealable-analogizing from the oft-compared 
preliminary criminal hearings before a United States Commissioner.33 But 
this theory also has several weaknesses. First, the appealability of other 
extraordinary judicial proceedings, such as those for disbarment34 and 
naturalization,35 has been repeatedly recognized under the same statute. 
Second, a preliminary criminal hearing is truly preliminary, to be followed 
by other careful judicial steps which are designed to safeguard the sub-
stantive and procedural rights of the accused. But, if the right of appeal 
were denied, a valid extradition hearing would be the last and only such 
judicial proceeding available in this country. Habeas corpus proceedings 
provide little assistance in this regard,36 since lying only to determine 
whether the magistrate had jurisdiction, whether the offense charged was 
within the treaty, and whether there was any legal evidence upon which 
the magistrate could decide that there were reasonable grounds to believe 
the accused guilty.37 Since the decision of the Secretary of State, who has 
the final power to refuse extradition,38 will in most cases probably be based 
upon the judicial determination, no good reason appears why these cru-
cial hearings should not be as free from prejudicial error as all other cases 
supervised by appellate review. In the absence of express congressional 
exception, the courts of appeals should have jurisdiction of appeals from 
all final decisions of a district judge, including those in extradition cases.39 
Although the contrary historical doctrine has advantages such as elimina-
tion of delay, it is believed that direct appeal can alone insure that the 
district court judge keeps within the bounds of his authority.40 Such an 
50 F.2d 687 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 665 (1931), with Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 
187 (1902) (criminal), and Rice v. Ames, 180 U.S. 371, 375 (1901) (criminal). 
33 See Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309 (1922); In re Oteiza y Lones, 136 U.S. 330 (1890); 
Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457 (1888). 
34 In re Patterson, 176 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1949); Howard v. Wilbur, 166 F.2d 884 
(6th Cir. 1948); In re Schachne, 87 F.2d 887 (2d Cir. 1937). 
31! Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568 (1926); Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 
(1922); Estrin v. United States, 80 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1935). 
36 Habeas corpus cannot be used as a substitute for direct appeal. McNamara v. 
Henkel, 226 U.S. 520 (1913); Ex parte Harding, 120 U.S. 782 (1887); Council v. Clemmer, 
165 F.2d 249 (D.C. Cir. 1947). 
37 Sec cases cited note 33 supra. 
38 18 U.S.C. § 3186 (1958); but there can be no extradition from the United States 
without a prior certification by an examining magistrate, the executive having no 
inherent power to extradite on its own initiative. Valentine v. United States ex rel. 
Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 (1936). 
89 Cf. Merino v. Hocke, 289 F.2d 636 (9th Cir. 1961). 
40 If it is true that a court of appeals has no jurisdiction in this type of case, then 
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approach would prevent, for example, what occurred in the principal case, 
where the demanding government turned the extradition hearings into 
a "fishing expedition" unconnected with their legitimate purposes.41 The 
ramifications of denying the right of appeal in extradition cases should 
be carefully reconsidered before the historical doctrine is followed. 
MaTtin R. Fine, S.Ed. 
the "all-writs" statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1958), would be unavailable as a means of COD• 
trolling or correcting a district judge (except as to the narrow questions reviewable OD 
habeas corpus) since this method cannot be used to acquire jurisdiction [United States 
v. Mayer, 285 U.S. 55 (1914); Oregon ex rel. Sherwood v. Gladden, 240 F.2d 910 (9th 
Cir. 1957); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Holly, 185 F.2d 675 (7th Cir. 1948)], the writs being 
used only where the action below would serve to defeat or impair the court's appellate 
jurisdiction already defined. Petsel v. Riley, 192 F.2d 954 (8th Cir. 1951). 
,1 As to the necessity of the information desired, see First Nat'l City Bank v. Arilte• 
guieta, 287 FJ?d 219 (2d Cir. 1960), cerl. granted, 865 U.S. 840 (1961), reversing 188 F. 
Supp. 865 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). 
